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 OPINION OF THE COURT 




ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 A.R., a juvenile, challenges an order of the district 
court granting the government's motion to proceed against him as 
an adult.  At the adult certification hearing, also referred to 
as the transfer hearing, the government introduced into evidence 
several psychiatric and psychological reports.  The evaluations 
of defendant, upon which these reports were based, were conducted 
in preparation for a similar certification motion, then pending 
in state court, regarding unrelated state charges.  A.R. objected 
to the use of these reports, contending that their use violated 
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because the evaluations were 
performed without prior Miranda warnings and without prior notice 
to his appointed counsel.  A.R. also claims that the district 
court abused its discretion in granting the motion to proceed 
against him as an adult.  Because we find these contentions to be 
without merit, we will affirm the order of the district court. 
 I. 
 On May 27, 1993, appellant A.R. and a group of 
companions allegedly spotted a white Pontiac Trans Am in a hotel 
parking lot and decided to steal it.  A.R. approached the car, 
pointed a gun at the head of the woman in the driver's seat and 
told her to get out because he was taking the car.  The driver 
and her passenger got out of the car.  A.R. and N.A., a female 
juvenile who accompanied him, got into the Trans Am and drove 
away.  They were apprehended following a high-speed chase.  A.R. 
was charged with conspiracy to commit carjacking, the substantive 
offense of carjacking, and use of a firearm during the commission 
of a crime of violence.  After he was in custody, state 
authorities also filed charges against him for a number of armed 
robberies at ATM machines committed the day before the 
carjacking. 
 At the time of his arrest, A.R. was 17 years old.  He 
was taken to a juvenile detention center where he underwent a 
psychological evaluation on June 11 and a psychiatric evaluation 
on June 16.  Both were conducted at the request of the district 
attorney, working on the state charges, for use in a hearing in 
state court to determine whether A.R. should be certified as an 
adult.  The reports of these evaluations were designed only for 
use in the certification proceeding and were not intended for 




 The reports concerned A.R.'s intellectual development 
and psychological maturity.  In addition, the reports commented 
upon his past problems, his response to prior treatment efforts, 
and the likelihood or not of future treatment within the juvenile 
justice system being successful.  The reports included summaries 
of the doctors' conversations with A.R. concerning the carjacking 
incident and his general course of delinquent behavior.  They 
also included observations on his attitude and social 
interaction.  The psychiatrist's report concluded that A.R. had a 
"conduct disorder" and a "personality disorder, mixed type," and 
stated in its recommendation that "[h]is behavior thus far 
indicates need for a highly secure facility."  App. at 279.  The 
psychologist focused on A.R.'s intransigence and sarcasm during 
their interview, as well as his reported difficulties in 
"thinking."  The report concludes: 
 It appears that [A.R.] was not honest in 
today's interview.  Moreover, he made a 
number of statements which are alarming.  
Although he claims not to remember the latest 
incident, he never expressed any regret over 
his behavior.  Instead, he tends to glorify 
himself and what he has done.  [A.R.] has 
already demonstrated his failure to benefit 
from placement and his open defiance of the 
rules of those placements.  At this time, I 
cannot think of anything more that the 
juvenile system can offer him. 
App. at 281. 
 According to A.R., he was not given Miranda warnings 
prior to the evaluations, nor was his counsel given notice that 
they were to occur.  The record before us contains no explicit 
 
 
factual findings concerning the truth of the allegations in the 
report.
2
  The government concedes that the usual practice prior 
to this type of evaluation includes neither the giving of Miranda 
warnings nor the provision of notice to counsel.  We will assume 
that no warning or notice was given. 
 After the government filed its information in this 
case, it sought the district court's permission to proceed 
against A.R. as an adult.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032, the 
district court held a hearing on the adult certification motion 
on October 13, 1993, at which both sides presented witnesses.  
The statute provides that, at such a transfer hearing, 
 [e]vidence of the following factors shall be 
considered, and findings with regard to each 
factor shall be made in the record, in 
assessing whether transfer would be in the 
interest of justice: the age and social 
background of the juvenile; the nature of the 
alleged offense; the extent and nature of the 
juvenile's prior delinquency record; the 
juvenile's present intellectual development 
and psychological maturity; the nature of 
past treatment efforts and the juvenile's 
response to such efforts; the availability of 
programs designed to treat the juvenile's 
behavioral problems. 
18 U.S.C. § 5032.  At the hearing, the district court heard 
testimony from a number of witnesses familiar with A.R. and his 
background.  Although neither of the doctors, who conducted the 
evaluations at issue on this appeal, were called to testify, 
their reports were nevertheless admitted into evidence over 
                     
    
2
But see footnote 3, supra.   
 
 
A.R.'s objection that they were obtained in violation of his 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
3
 
 A.R. did present his own psychiatrist, Dr. Wettstein.  
Dr. Wettstein testified that he felt that "there is a reasonable 
possibility that [A.R.] can be held in the juvenile system 
clinically, psychologically, psychiatrically."  Ap. at 247.  He 
acknowledged, however, that A.R. "doesn't have good enough 
impulse control at this point to manage things.  So he has to 
live in a residential facility that's fairly secure," App. at 
251, and agreed that A.R. is "a dangerous individual."  App. at 
256. 
 On October 25, 1993, the district court entered an 
order granting the government's motion to proceed against A.R. as 
an adult.  A.R. filed a timely notice of appeal on November 2, 
1993. 
 II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this juvenile 
delinquency proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order exception to the 
final judgment rule.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Government of the 
Virgin Islands in the Interest of: A.M., No. 93-7736 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 16, 1994) (holding that transfer orders fall within the 
                     
    
3
 Counsel did not request an opportunity to cross-examine the 
doctors who prepared the reports or present evidence concerning 
their backgrounds, methods or conclusions.  Once the reports were 




collateral order doctrine).  We have plenary review of the 
district court's disposition of A.R.'s constitutional claims.  
United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1106 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985).  Because the decision to transfer a 
juvenile for prosecution as an adult is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, we review that decision only for 
an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 
1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989). 
 III. 
 The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person ... 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself."  The privilege against self-incrimination is rooted in 
the notion that ours is an accusatorial, rather than 
inquisitorial system.  As such, the individual may not be forced, 
through his own testimony, to assist the state in securing a 
conviction against him.  Toward that end, the privilege "protects 
any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could 
be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other 
evidence that might be so used."  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 
(1967) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 
(1964) (White, J., concurring)).  The focus, then, is not on the 
type of proceeding in which a statement is made "but upon the 
nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it 
invites."  Id. at 49. 
 
 
 A.R.'s Fifth Amendment challenge to the use of the 
reports of the psychiatric and psychological evaluations at the 
transfer hearing is based on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).  In Estelle, which 
concerned a capital murder prosecution, the trial court ordered a 
pre-trial psychiatric evaluation of the defendant in order to 
determine whether he was competent to stand trial.  The defendant 
was not informed of his rights prior to the evaluation, was 
adjudged competent to stand trial, and was found guilty of first 
degree murder.  The problem arose at the sentencing phase of the 
trial when the court allowed the government to present the 
testimony of the psychiatrist who performed the evaluation, 
concerning the future dangerousness of the defendant. 
 In affirming the order vacating the death sentence, the 
Court provided three bases for its conclusion that the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated.  First, because 
of "the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase," 
the Court noted that it could "discern no basis to distinguish 
between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent's capital 
murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is concerned."  451 U.S. at 462-63.  Second, the Court 
found it significant that the use of defendant's statements from 
the evaluation in the penalty phase went considerably beyond "the 
limited, neutral purpose of determining his competency to stand 
trial" for which the evaluation was ordered.  Id. at 465. 
 
 
 Consequently, the interview with Dr. Grigson 
cannot be characterized as a routine 
competency examination restricted to ensuring 
that respondent understood the charges 
against him and was capable of assisting in 
his defense.  Indeed, if the application of 
Dr. Grigson's findings had been confined to 
serving that function, no Fifth Amendment 
issue would have arisen." 
Id. (emphasis added).  Finally, the Court examined the consider-
ations undergirding Miranda's restrictions on custodial 
interrogation.  It concluded that the use of the psychiatrist's 
testimony at the penalty phase in effect transformed what, it 
again emphasized, was otherwise "a neutral competency 
examination" into custodial interrogation within Miranda's 
purview. 
 When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting 
to the court on the issue of competence and 
testified for the prosecution at the penalty 
phase on the crucial issue of respondent's 
future dangerousness, his role changed and 
became essentially like that of an agent of 
the State recounting unwarned statements made 
in a postarrest custodial setting. 
Id. at 467.   
 Viewed in terms of the general Fifth Amendment 
principles outlined above, the reason the evaluation created a 
self-incrimination problem when used at the penalty stage, but 
not at the competency determination, lies in the purpose and 
effect of the evaluation's use.  At the penalty stage in Estelle, 
the defendant's statements were being used to prove an element of 
the government's burden in the criminal prosecution.  At the 
 
 
competency stage, however, the issue of guilt or innocence is yet 
to be addressed.  Before the substance of the case can be 
addressed, the court has to determine whether the status of the 
defendant is such that the case can proceed at all.  As the Court 
concluded in Estelle, as long as the use of the evaluation is 
confined to this preliminary scope, there is no Fifth Amendment 
violation.   
 Consideration of the present case in light of the 
analysis in Estelle, informed by the purposes of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, leads us to conclude that there was 
no violation of A.R.'s Fifth Amendment rights.  Other courts 
addressing adult certification hearings have repeatedly 
characterized them as civil in nature,
4
 primarily because they 
result only in a decision upon the status of the individual.  
See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 
                     
    
4
 Our analysis of this point, as well as of the issues 
presented more generally in this case, is informed by the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), in 
which it considered the question of what protections must be 
afforded a juvenile at a transfer hearing.  The Court did not 
express an opinion as to the merits of transfer in the case, but 
held that "there is no place in our system of law for reaching a 
result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony--without 
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a 
statement of reasons."  Id. at 554.  The Court cautioned, 
however, that "[w]e do not mean by this to indicate that the 
hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a 
criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but 
we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of 
due process and fair treatment."  Id. at 562. 
 
 
1990).  The determination is not one of guilt or innocence, or 
even of delinquency or non-delinquency, but rather concerns the 
manner in which the state elects to proceed against an alleged 
malefactor.  As such, the district court "is entitled to assume 
that the juvenile committed the offense charged for the purpose 
of the transfer hearing."  In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 369 
(D.C. Cir. 1990).  Furthermore, while the evidence introduced at 
the hearing must be consistent with the concepts of due process 
and fundamental fairness, it need not be in compliance with the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d at 
1255.  And although the government bears the burden of rebutting 
the statutory presumption of juvenile treatment, the government 
need only persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Parker, 956 F.2d at 171.  Finally, the ultimate decision on 
waiver is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  
United States v. Gerald N., 900 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 The determination that the trial court must make at an 
adult certification hearing, then, parallels that which must be 
made at a competency hearing.  Both proceedings deal with a 
preliminary forensic determination.  More fundamentally, both 
deal with whether a defendant should be exempted from criminal 
prosecution because he falls within a category of persons who, in 
the eyes of the law, are not viewed as fully responsible for 
their acts.  The use of the psychiatric or psychological reports 
is very similar, whether they are generated when an adult is 
 
 
examined for competency or a juvenile is examined for 
certification as an adult.  In neither case does the report bear 
on the ultimate substantive question of guilt or innocence.  In 
both situations, the evaluation serves the same "limited, neutral 
purpose."
5
  The failure to administer Miranda warnings to A.R. 
prior to the evaluations did not deprive him of his right against 
self-incrimination, because the use of the evaluations at the 
transfer hearing did not incriminate him.
6
 
                     
    
5
 The transfer statute provides that "[s]tatements made by a 
juvenile prior to or during a transfer hearing shall not be 
admissible at subsequent criminal proceedings."  18 U.S.C. § 
5032. 
    
6
 We note that we are aware of and have considered United 
States v. J.D., 517 F.Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), which is 
apparently the only other case considering this precise question 
and which reached a contrary result.  The court's reasoning in 
that case, however, was explicitly based on the Supreme Court's 
statement in Gault that "no person shall be 'compelled' to be a 
witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of 
his liberty."  387 U.S. at 50.  In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 
364, 372 (1986), the Supreme Court backed away from this broad 
statement of the privilege's applicability in civil proceedings, 
here a civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous 
Persons Act, proclaiming that it "is plainly not good law." 
 We note further that the court in United States v. J.D. gave 
as one reason for its decision the fact that "defendants would be 
open to a far larger period of incarceration if the transfer 
motion were to be successful than if they were to be proceeded 
against as juveniles."  517 F.Supp. at 72.  However, to date 
there has not been defined a constitutional right to be tried in 
the court where, if the defendant were to be found guilty, the 
lightest sanction would be imposed.  Cf. Sill v. Pennsylvania 
State University, 462 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1972) ("It is well 
settled that there is no constitutional right to be heard by a 
particular tribunal", citing Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142 
(1922)).  For this reason, we conclude that, despite the penalty 
that may ensue, the civil proceeding to select the appropriate 
forum in which to try a defendant does not implicate Fifth 




 The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense."  A.R.'s Sixth Amendment 
challenge is also based on Estelle.    The accused in that case, 
Ernest Benjamin Smith, had appointed counsel at the time of the 
examination.  The Supreme Court held that, under the 
circumstances there presented, Smith had "a Sixth Amendment right 
to the assistance of counsel before submitting to the pretrial 
psychiatric interview."  451 U.S. at 469.  The Court explained 
the rationale for the right to counsel as follows: 
 It is central to the Sixth Amendment 
principle that in addition to counsel's 
presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed 
that he need not stand alone against the 
State at any stage of the prosecution, formal 
or informal, in court or out, where counsel's 
absence might derogate from the accused's 
right to a fair trial. 
451 U.S. at 470 (brackets omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967)).  The Sixth Amendment 
violation in Estelle stemmed from the fact that the psychiatric 
evaluation "proved to be a 'critical stage' of the aggregate 
proceedings against respondent."  Id.  Thus the evaluation was 
not itself inherently the sort of event to which the right to 
counsel attaches.  Instead, as was the case under the Fifth 
Amendment, the psychiatrist's testimony only became a problem 
 
 
when used for something apart from, and with more dire potential 
consequences than, the competency determination.
7
 
 This reading of Estelle is consistent with the rest of 
the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, from which the Ninth 
Circuit has extracted three factors by which to measure whether a 
given proceeding is a "critical stage" such that the right to 
counsel attaches: 
 First, if failure to pursue strategies or 
remedies results in a loss of significant 
rights, then Sixth Amendment protections 
attach.  Second, where skilled counsel would 
be useful in helping the accused understand 
the legal confrontation ... a critical stage 
exists.  Third, the right to counsel applies 
if the proceeding tests the merits of the 
accused's case. 
Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(citations to Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), and United 
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), omitted); United States v. 
Bohn, 890 F.2d 1079, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 1989).  See also Meadows 
v. Kuhlmann, 812 F.2d 72, 76-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 
915 (1987); 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal 
Procedure § 11.2(b) (1984). 
                     
    
7
 That Estelle's holding that the right to counsel attached 
to the psychiatric evaluation depends on the later use of the 
evaluation at the sentencing proceeding is supported by the 
Court's opinions in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), in 
which it characterized Estelle as holding "that defendants 
formally charged with capital crimes have a Sixth Amendment right 
to consult with counsel before submitting to psychiatric 
examinations designed to determine their future dangerousness," 
id. at 251 (emphasis added), and Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 
(1989) (per curiam). 
 
 
 Applied to the instant case, it seems clear that the 
evaluations of A.R. are not the sort of "critical stage" to which 
the right to counsel attaches.  None of the factors identified by 
the Ninth Circuit are directly implicated, nor, in the language 
of Estelle, would the absence of counsel "derogate from the 
accused's right to a fair trial."  451 U.S. at 470.  No 
significant rights are at stake in the evaluation itself.  At the 
transfer hearing, where a determination is actually made as to 
the juvenile's status, a juvenile has the right to counsel as 
well as the opportunity to attack the methods employed and 
conclusions reached by the person who conducted the evaluation.  
Nor is the evaluation a legal confrontation that can only be 
fully understood after consultation with counsel.  Furthermore, 
the merits of the juvenile's case are not in issue for, as noted 
above, the trial court in the context of an adult certification 
hearing may assume that the juvenile committed the offense.   
 For these reasons, and because § 5032 provides that a 
juvenile's statements made "prior to or during a transfer 
hearing" may not be used at a criminal trial, the right to a fair 
trial, which underlies Estelle, is not implicated.  Simply 
stated, counsel would serve no functional purpose at a 
psychiatric evaluation the results of which are used, as is 
necessarily the case here, only in making the neutral 
determination whether a juvenile should stay within the juvenile 
 
 
justice system or be treated as an adult.
8
  A.R., therefore, had 
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in connection with the 
evaluations. 
 V. 
 A.R.'s final claim is that the district court abused 
its discretion in deciding to certify him for adult prosecution.  
In general, a district court abuses its discretion when it acts 
in a fashion "clearly contrary to reason and not justified by the 
evidence."  Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 
1977).  In the context of a certification order, such an abuse of 
discretion occurs if the court fails to make the factual findings 
as required by 18 U.S.C. § 5032; see United States v. C.G., 736 
F.2d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 1984), or if the court's factual 
findings are clearly erroneous; see United States v. Gerald N., 
900 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. G.T.W., 
992 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1993). 
                     
    
8
 Further support for our holding may be found in this 
court's decision in United States ex rel. Stukes v. Shovlin, 464 
F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1972).  In that habeas case the state trial 
court had, on its own motion and without notice to either side, 
ordered the defendant to undergo a psychiatric examination for 
purposes of determining whether he was competent to stand trial.  
We held that the examination was not a "critical stage" of the 
proceedings.  Id. at 1213 & n.5.  With respect to the assertion 
that counsel should have been given notice of the evaluation, we 
held as follows:  "The examination was completely ex parte 
without notice to or knowledge of it by either defense counsel or 
the prosecution.  Under the circumstances shown in this record, 
we find that the failure to notify counsel of the examination did 
not deny defendant a fair trial or the effective assistance of 
trial counsel."  Id. at 1214. 
 
 
 A.R. makes no allegation that these conditions exist.  
Though the district court's opinion is brief, it manifests full 
consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing.  The 
court made specific findings under each of the six statutory 
factors and explained how each weighed in the transfer decision.  
A.R. attacks this weighing, suggesting that the court 
overemphasized the "seriousness of the offense" factor.  
Carjacking is a violent felony, however, and A.R. threatened his 
victims with a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol.  The court was 
entitled to give more weight to this factor than to others, and 
generally to weigh the statutory factors as it deemed 
appropriate.  United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1255 (5th Cir. 
1989). 
 Next, A.R. suggests that the court did not give proper 
emphasis to the testimony of his witnesses.  Credibility 
determinations of this sort, however, depend on first-hand 
observation of the witness and for that reason are best left to 
the judgment of the district court.  Absent a claim of prejudice-
-and we are presented with no such claim here--this court will 
not second-guess the district court's conclusions concerning the 
credibility of witnesses and its implications for the weighing of 
testimony based on a cold record. 
 Finally, A.R. suggests that the district court 
improperly shifted the burden of proof because its opinion states 
that "the nature of the offenses with which he is charged and his 
 
 
response to previous treatment efforts do not indicate a 
probability of rehabilitation as a juvenile."  United States v. 
A.R., No. 93-125, at 7 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 25, 1993).  The statute 
clearly intends a presumption of juvenile treatment, and the 
government bears the burden of establishing that transfer is 
warranted.  Some courts have adopted a "preponderance" standard, 
United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1992), while 
others have opted for a "clearly convincing" standard.  United 
States v. M.L., 811 F.Supp. 491 (C.D.Cal. 1992).  Here there is 
no claim of insufficient evidence, however, and the quoted 
sentence is only one aspect of the district court's 
consideration.  The ultimate standard, set forth in the statute, 
is whether the court finds that the transfer "would be in the 
interests of justice."  18 U.S.C. § 5032.  Because the district 
court followed proper procedures and made findings with 
substantial support in the record, its order should be affirmed. 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district 
court granting the government's motion to proceed against A.R. as 
an adult will be affirmed. 
